Background. Variation in the intensity of acute care treatment at the end of life is influenced more strongly by hospital and provider characteristics than patient preferences. Objective. We sought to describe physicians' mental models (i.e., thought processes) when encountering a simulated critically and terminally ill older patient, and to compare those models based on whether their treatment plan was patient preference-concordant or preference-discordant. Methods. Seventy-three hospital-based physicians from 3 academic medical centers engaged in a simulated patient encounter and completed a mental model interview while watching the video recording of their encounter. We used an ''expert'' model to code the interviews. We then used Kruskal-Wallis tests to compare the weighted mental model themes of physicians who provided preference-concordant treatment with those who provided preference-discordant treatment. Results. Sixty-six (90%) physicians provided preference-concordant treatment and 7 (10%) provided preference-discordant treatment (i.e., they intubated the patient). Physicians who intubated the patient were more likely to emphasize the reversible and emergent nature of the patient situation (z = 22.111, P = 0.035), their own comfort (z = 22.764, P = 0.006), and rarely focused on explicit patient preferences (z = 2.380, P = 0.017). Limitations. Post-decisional interviewing with audio/video prompting may induce hindsight bias. The expert model has not yet been validated and may not be exhaustive. The small sample size limits generalizability and power. Conclusions. Hospital-based physicians providing preference-discordant used a different mental model for decision making for a critically and terminally ill simulated case. These differences may offer targets for future interventions to promote preference-concordant care for seriously ill patients.
Variation exists in the triage 1 and treatment 2 of seriously ill older patients at the end of their lives. Research suggests that this variation cannot be fully explained by illness characteristics 3 or patient preferences. 4, 5 Instead, characteristics of the region or the hospital to which the patient is admitted appear to drive these variations, 6 with treatment variation at the hospital level still a subject of speculation.
One comparative, qualitative case study of 2 academic medical centers that varied in end-of-life (EOL) treatment intensity suggested that variation in patient care may be driven by differences in physician decision making norms regarding life-sustaining treatment strategies. Differing norms include the goals of life-sustaining treatment, the definition of a ''dying'' patient, the locus of decisional control, and the relative importance of harms of commission v. omission. 7 A companion simulation study identified how norms might affect hospital-based physicians' decision making heuristics, case perceptions, and the consequential diagnosis and treatment of a seriously ill patient. 8 A deeper understanding of hospital-based physicians' decision making processes might help further explain the variations in EOL treatment intensity attributable to providers (rather than patient preferences) and thereby identify opportunities for interventions to promote preference-concordant treatment. To this end, the purpose of the current study was to describe the mental model (i.e., thought process) of hospital-based physicians from 3 academic medical centers who made preferenceconcordant v. preference-discordant treatment decisions for a simulated critically and terminally ill older patients with informed, stable treatment preferences.
Materials And Methods

Simulation
We analyzed physician interviews from 2 parent studies exploring hospital-based physician contributions to variation in EOL treatment intensity using a mixed-methods mental model approach. Details regarding participant recruitment, simulation procedures, and data collection have been previously reported. 8, 9 Briefly, we designed a case scenario that described a man in his late 70's with metastatic cancer and progressively worsening vital signs. We combined Sim-Man technology vital signs tracings with experienced and trained standardized patients. Physician subjects received a chart before entering the room, including a discharge summary from a recent 2-month hospital stay, a report of a 1-week-old CT scan, and the assessment and plan from his presentation to the emergency department. The chart contained no advance care plan. The patient had a ''do not intubate'' order documented at the skilled nursing facility from which he had been admitted but it was not transferred to the hospital.
The patient was accompanied by his caregiver wife. The patient and his wife knew there were no further curative treatments available and expected him to live no longer than 3 to 6 more months. If asked during the encounter, the patient and his wife would reveal their knowledge of the cancer prognosis, preference for avoiding re-admission to the ICU, or intubation, and to receive comfort-focused treatment. The patient's role preference for decision making was to make his own decisions independent of the physician (however, he is dyspneic and unable to speak more than 1 to 2 words). The patient's wife was aware of this role preference but is ambivalent about her husband's treatment preference and has a more passive role preference for decision making. Given a choice between treatment alternatives, she will ask the doctor for a recommendation. If the doctor makes a treatment plan recommendation, she will accept it. If the doctor makes a directive treatment plan without assessing treatment preferences, she will acquiesce. If, on the other hand, the doctor offers a choice between 2 treatment options, she will choose the least intensive option.
The scenario was designed to induce an experience of time pressure for decision making in 2 ways. First, the patient's vital signs met standard criteria for a ''rapid response team'' upon entry into the room. Second, the patient's vital signs steadily deteriorate over the course of the simulation; however, the patient does not frankly arrest. The simulation is ended when the physician makes a treatment plan or 30 minutes elapses, whichever is first.
Mental Models Approach
The term ''mental models'' refers to a methodological approach to understand decision making processes, represented in the form of propositions or diagrams. Common diagrammatic mental model approaches include concept mapping, semantic web formation, and decision analysis. [10] [11] [12] Decision analysis-based mental models can be used to describe a target population's understanding and conceptualization of decision processes, as characterized through direct or indirect elicitation. 10, 13, 14 Our mental model analysis fits the latter category by using a ''think-aloud'' interview (e.g., indirect elicitation), which prompts physician research participants to recall their thought process during a simulated patient encounter while watching a video playback of the encounter. The subject's answers were analyzed for key topics and references linking 2 topics. We then arranged the identified topics into a diagram with visual connections representing ideological connections.
Participants
Participants included emergency medicine, hospitalist, and intensivist physicians from 3 major academic medical centers. These medical centers reflected a range of end-oflife treatment intensity, as measured by ICU use among chronically ill, Medicare fee-for-service decedents. 15 Institution A had the least intensive ICU use (3.6 ICU days per Medicare decedent in the last 6 mo of life; 23% of their terminal admissions involving an ICU stay); Institution C had the most intensive ICU use (13.9 ICU days per decedent; 41% of terminal admissions involving an ICU stay); and Institution B more closely mirrored the national average (4.7 ICU days per decedent; 26% of terminal admissions involving an ICU stay). 15 Eighty-seven participants completed the simulation encounter, 73 (84%) of whom had complete debriefing interviews. For the remainder, the study time elapsed before the participant finished watching their encounter video with the interviewer and therefore the interview was incomplete. In qualitative research using semi-structured interviews, 10 to 15 interviews per group is typically sufficient to achieve thematic saturation. 16 This secondary analysis seeks to understand intubation decisions, which occurred in 10% of the simulations. Based on a sample size of 73, we had sufficient power to detect only very large differences in the mental model concept category weights between intubators and non-intubators (i.e., 80% power to detect an odds ratio of approximately 7).
Simulation Outcome
As previously described, 9 we identified intubation and other treatment decisions by live coding during the encounter (i.e., statements to the patient or surrogate regarding the treatment plan) and from orders written after the encounter. A decision to intubate the patient would be preference-discordant and was considered a medical error in this simulation.
Physician Characteristics
We recorded physician demographics and validated measures of reactions to uncertainty 17 and risk tolerance 18 in a web-based survey completed after the simulation.
Interview Procedure
After completing the simulation, participants completed a mental model debriefing interview while watching a video of their encounter. The debriefing interview followed a semi-structured format to allow interviewees to express ideas naturally, in their own words. The interview consisted of 5 sections corresponding to the main areas of interest: 1) the physician's recollection of their goal when entering the patient's room, 2) the thought process during each 2-minute segment of the scenario, 3) their thought process in response to actors' scripted statements, 4) inquiry of factors supporting an intention to intubate the patient, 5) differences between the simulation patient and patients with a similar prognosis, and the perception of the patient's preferences regarding intubation. One of 4 investigators conducted each interview after being trained by a social scientist experienced in the method.
Expert Model Diagram Formation
We generated an expert model diagram based on discussion with a panel of experts on the predicted topics of relevance to the physician's thought processes during simulation ( Figure 1 ). The panel had expertise in decision sciences, communication, critical care, and palliative care. The model informed the codebook and contains 12 topics with a total of 44 subtopics grouped by meaning. Connections between concepts are demonstrated by a single line (e.g., between ''physician evaluation'' and ''physician action''), and do not occur between all topics.
Content Analysis
Three raters coded the transcribed interviews. The coding process parsed responses to interview questions into statements identified as complete thoughts. These varied from a phrase to a few sentences. For each distinct statement, any particular code was applied only once. Training involved raters independently coding transcripts, then discussing and negotiating disagreements, until successfully completing 2 subsequent interviews at 80% or higher agreement. Thereafter, 2 raters independently coded a subset of 20% of all interviews to allow the computation of reliability statistics. The raters agreed when assigning codes to the same phrases 84% of the time, suggesting sufficient reliability.
Statistical Analyses
We used descriptive statistics to summarize the characteristics of physician subjects drawn from closed-ended survey responses. We tested whether physicians' demographics or their attitudes towards uncertainty or risk were associated with intubation using Kruskall-Wallis or Mann-Whitney tests. Further analysis using multivariate logistic regression was impractical due to the collinearity of several variables. We also tested the correlation between physician's other actions during the simulation (e.g., prescribing opioids for symptoms, eliciting treatment preferences) and intubation.
We summarized the percentage of interviewees who mentioned each concept or a relationship between concepts from the expert model at least once in the entire interview. We then generated a weighted category score for each concept group. This weighting process adjusts for redundancy introduced by talkativeness and differences in model saturation (i.e., the extent to which the subject mentions all of the concepts in the mental model). 19 For example, redundancy due to talkativeness or concept repetition would artificially increase the value of the concept if weighting were not performed (see Appendix for details). We used Kruskal-Wallis procedures to test for differences in mental model weighted category scores due to the non-normal distribution of the data.
Interested investigators may contact the senior author for access to a de-identified data set. Figure 1 Expert mental model of key concepts described by physicians encountering a terminally and critically ill older patients. Concepts or ideas were identified and grouped by an expert panel into concept categories with a descriptive heading. For example, the concept category ''Patient Understanding'' has 2 related sub-concepts termed ''see reality'' and ''competent''. The grouping is represented by the encompassing box. Lines connecting the concept category boxes represent ideological links or relationships between the concept categories (e.g., instances in which concepts were mentioned in the same statement during the interview.) Not all concept categories were thought to have ideological links and are not connected by a line.
Results
Physician Characteristics
The 73 participants were aged 29 to 70 y and most were white and male (Table 1) . On average, they had 13 years in medical practice. Most had primary board certification in internal medicine (56%) or emergency medicine (27%), and 40% worked in an ICU setting. Our measures of physician's attitudes towards uncertainty were similar to the physicians involved in scale construction 17 with the exception of a higher level of discomfort when disclosing uncertainty to patients. Also similar to other samples, 18 physicians were more willing to gamble when the status quo involved certain loss.
Treatment Decisions
Most physicians (n = 44; 60%) treated the patient with comfort-focused care. The remaining physicians did not, including 7 physicians (10%) who actually intubated the patient. We defined intubation as preference-discordant treatment.
Predictors of treatment decisions
No physician demographic characteristics were associated with the decision to intubate (Table 2) . Physician reluctance to disclose uncertainty to patients (t = 22.152, df = 69, P = 0.03) and reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians (z = 21.943, P = 0.05) were associated with intubation. Intubation was association with other physician simulation actions, including eliciting treatment preferences (2/7 (23%) v. 62/66 (71%), P \ 0.001) and administering opiates for symptom management (0/7 (0%) v. 43/66 (65%), P \ 0.001).
Mental Model Outcomes
We compared the mental model concept category scores of physicians who did and did not intubate the patient. We present the unweighted frequencies of the mental model concepts of physicians who did (intubators) and did not intubate the patient (non-intubators) in Figure 2 . Concepts and concept categories (categories within the concept) with greater frequencies have denser outlines. We present the comparison of weighted concept categories for intubators and non-intubators in Table 3 . We 17 ). Higher scores indicate greater anxiety, concern about bad outcomes, relutance to disclose uncertainty to patients, and reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians, respectively. The maximum ranges that can be measured by the scales are 5 to 30 for the anxiety and disclosing uncertainty to patients scales, 3 to 18 for the bad outcomes scale, and 2 to 12 for the disclosing mistakes to physicians scale. provide example quotations associated with mental model concepts and concept categories in the Appendix.
Similarities. Intubators and non-intubators emphasized physician goals and physician evaluation during the debriefing of their simulation encounter. Neither group mentioned patient demographics.
Differences. We identified 3 statistically significant differences in mental model concept emphasis: patient situation, physician perception, and patient preferences (Table 3) .
Patient's situation (Figure 2 , concept category 2). Intubators emphasized the patient's situation more often than non-intubators (z = 22.111, P = 0.035). Moreover, intubators more often described the patient situation using terms related to ''emergency'', ''reversibility'', and ''imminence'', whereas non-intubators more often described the patient situation as ''end-of-life''. For example, one intubator explained: ''.if I intubate him today and let us say that he has pneumonia or he is septic. a couple of days of antibiotics can reverse all of that stuff and he can come back.'' (Subject BX2). These perceptions of reversibility directly impacted treatment plans, as another intubator explained: ''I do not, at this point,.address the end-of-life issues in this case, because my feeling, in my own mind, was that we had a very more tangible, at least short-term, remedy in this case.'' (Subject B04). In contrast, one non-intubator explained: ''.if they have limited time, we can do all the critical care measures, but I do not know if that is going to change or increase his lifespan. So that is why, at this kind of stage of the game, I sort of go by what the patient wants.'' (Subject B16).
Physician's perceptions. (Figure 2 , concept category 4). Intubators emphasized their own perceptions of the case more than non-intubators (z = 22.764, P = 0.006). Intubators' own comfort level was commonly mentioned in association with communication actions. Discomfort with the case was mentioned in context of increased caution. As one intubator explained: ''it's a bit uncomfortable approaching that [end of life care] particularly in the presence of the patient, hence the hesitation.'' (Subject B14). Additionally, intubators were also more likely to mention their own preferences for treatment in the situation.
Patient preferences (Figure 2 , concept category 6). Intubators focused less on patient preferences (z = 22.380, P = 0.017). Moreover, when intubators did discuss patient preferences, they more frequently mentioned ''inferred'' over ''explicitly stated'' patient preferences. Specifically, intubators inferred consent when the patient or surrogate did not question or correct the physician's treatment plan. As one intubator explained: ''[I] basically 
Discussion
In this study of hospital-based physicians from 3 US academic medical centers, we found that the mental model of physicians who provided preference-discordant treatment for a simulated critically and terminally ill older patients with stable treatment preferences differed in 3 key ways from those who provided preference-concordant treatment: The physicians providing preference-discordant treatment focused on the reversibility or emergent nature of the situation, on inferred rather than explicitly stated patient preferences, and on their own comfort level and preferences. A physician's mental model may reflect their general approach to patient care. In this study, the physicians who provided preference-discordant treatment focused on the imminently unstable but reversible situation. Their descriptions are reminiscent of the Biomedical Model 20 coined by Ronald Laing. The Biomedical Model reduces the doctor-patient encounter to the discovery and treatment of physiologic derangements and is the cornerstone of Western medical education. This model is echoed in other descriptions of medical decision making, such as the ''fix-it model'', where treatments are offered or chosen to restore a patient to normal health or functional state. 21 In contrast, physicians who provided preference-concordant care gave descriptions reminiscent of William Oslers' Aequanimitas or Humanist Model 22, 23 or the more recent Biopsychosocial Model. 24 The Biopsychosocial Model was proposed by George Engel 25 in 1977 and provides a holistic view of the patient including their social, psychological, and medical influences on their health state. This model is increasingly taught in Western medical schools and may be the foundation for the mental model of physicians who focused their attention on explicit elicitation of treatment preferences by prompting a longer-range view of the patient's situation. This longer-range view is echoed in an ''Outcomes model'' of medical decision making 26 where the focus is not only life expectancy but also quality of life. The grading of health outcomes can only be evaluated in the context of a patient's preferences and values. The 2 mental models described in this study, and their resulting short v. longer-range focus, mirror the differences described in our prior qualitative case study of ICU decision making regarding goals of lifesustaining treatment, the definition of dying, and the interpretation of advance directives. 7 Alternately, a physician's mental model may not represent a fixed philosophical approach to patient care but Numbers adjacent to the category name correspond to the same category box in Figure 1 . The category ''Demographics'' was not mentioned during any debriefing interview and is not included in this may change in response to certain contextual cues. In the case of a critically ill patient, physicians may default to 1 of the 2 mental models (''save the patient'' v. ''elicit treatment preferences for end of life care'') depending on contextual influences, such as a patient's age or underlying diagnosis. These ''cues'' may trigger different behavior or thought processes after some threshold is met. 27 For example, the non-intubators in our study might have had a mental model focus more similar to intubators if the patient had been a healthy 30-y-old rather than a 78-y-old with end-stage cancer.
Internal, emotional cues may also influence decision making. Indeed, physicians who intubated the patient were more likely to discuss their own comfort. These physicians reported greater discomfort with disclosing uncertainty and mistakes on the validated questionnaire. Earlier studies have found that physician intolerance for uncertainty is associated with increased medical spending. 30 Intrinsic differences in physician' risk tolerance may also influence physician decision making. Prior studies have found greater risk-aversion to certain losses increase the likelihood of intubating a seriously ill patient. 18 Whether the differences in the mental models were due to fixed philosophical differences or are potentially flexible in response to different internal or external ''cues'' has implications for interventions to improve shared decision making. If external, contextual cues can trigger different clinical decisions or behaviors in physicians, then directive education on the recognition of triggers and appropriate patient-centered responses may be helpful. One simple method could be the employment of well-structured communication protocols. 31, 32 Protocol use in other areas of medicine is common and especially helpful for complex, multi-component processes [33] [34] [35] or ensuring evidence-based care during time-pressured or emotionally charged situations, such as the provision of advanced cardiac life support for cardiac arrest. 36 However, it is also plausible that physicians' mental models are more stable and may undermine protocol adherence if, for example, some physicians neglect elicitation of patient preference in favor of a more diagnostic approach. In this case, novel experiential or simulated learning might be used to recalibrate heuristics; for example, using compelling narratives to create an availability bias and associated emotional cues regarding harms of failing to elicit patient preferences. If philosophical differences are driving the underlying mental model structures, the associated beliefs may have been acquired during training, and new education may be ineffective to create lasting behavioral change. In this case, educational efforts should be focused on how young physicians are trained.
Although this study has important strengths, including the use of high-fidelity simulation and the involvement of providers from 3 academic medical centers in different geographic locations with different EOL practice patterns, it also has several weaknesses. First, the small sample limits generalizability and power to detect differences between the 2 groups. Second, behavior and reflection in a simulation setting may not generalize to physicians' mental models in the ''real world.'' Third, the use of post-decisional mental model analysis relied on immediate recall and could be subject to hindsight bias. Generally, however, the mental models approach has proven to be predictive of future decisions. 13 Fourth, our expert model may not be exhaustive and has not been validated. We did not use the expert model to guide the interview questions but, instead, used the videotaped encounter itself to elicit participant responses. In other work, the expert model provides a comparator for decisions made by subjects or laypersons. 19, 37 In this study, we used initial observations of the encounter to build the expert model, with input from experts in communication, decision sciences, critical care, and palliative care before coding the interview transcripts. Nevertheless, our physician sample discussed concepts outside of the expert model only 10% of the time, and most of these unmatched statements were related to the believability of the simulation or patient rather than the decisions being made. We also appreciate that our interviews were not exhaustive and may not have uncovered a complete set of related concepts or constructs. Finally, although we achieved satisfactory levels of agreement between coders, semi-structured interview coding is vulnerable to measurement error.
In conclusion, hospital-based physicians in our study who intubated the patient against his preferences, were less likely to elicit patient's treatment preferences, focusing instead on short-term treatment goals, inferred preferences, and their own comfort and preferences for the case. Identifying these mental model differences and their associated behaviors (e.g., elicitation of preferences) may offer targets for interventions to promote preferenceconcordant treatment for seriously ill patients.
